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・ Stanislav Murikhin
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Stanislav Petrov
・ Stanislav Petrov (footballer)
・ Stanislav Petrík
・ Stanislav Petukhov
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Stanislav Petrov : ウィキペディア英語版
Stanislav Petrov

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Stanislav Yevgrafovich Petrov ((ロシア語:Станисла́в Евгра́фович Петро́в); born 1939 in Odessa, Ukraine〔http://themanwhosavedtheworldmovie.com/#stanislav-petrov〕) is a retired lieutenant colonel of the Soviet Air Defence Forces. On September 26, 1983, just three weeks after the Soviet military had shot down Korean Air Lines Flight 007, Petrov was the duty officer at the command center for the Oko nuclear early-warning system when the system reported that a missile, followed by another one and then up to five more, were being launched from the United States. Petrov judged the report to be a false alarm, and his decision is credited with having prevented an erroneous retaliatory nuclear attack on the United States and its NATO allies that could have resulted in large-scale nuclear war. Investigation later confirmed that the satellite warning system had indeed malfunctioned.
==The Incident==
(詳細はВ Нью-Йорке россиянина наградили за спасение мира ). Lenta.ru (in Russian)〕
Had Petrov reported incoming American missiles, his superiors might have launched an assault against the United States,〔(26 September 2013) (Stanislav Petrov: The man who may have saved the world ) BBC News Europe, Retrieved 26 September 2013〕 precipitating a corresponding nuclear response from the United States. Petrov declared the system's indication a false alarm. Later, it was apparent that he was right: no missiles were approaching and the computer detection system was malfunctioning. It was subsequently determined that the false alarm had been created by a rare alignment of sunlight on high-altitude clouds and the satellites' Molniya orbits, an error later corrected by cross-referencing a geostationary satellite.〔(Molniya orbit )〕
Petrov later indicated that the influences on his decision included: that he was informed a U.S. strike would be all-out, so five missiles seemed an illogical start;〔 that the launch detection system was new and, in his view, not yet wholly trustworthy; and that ground radar failed to pick up corroborative evidence, even after minutes of delay. However, in a 2013 interview, Petrov said at the time he was never sure that the alarm was erroneous. He felt that his civilian training helped him make the right decision. His colleagues were all professional soldiers with purely military training and, following instructions, would have reported a missile strike if they had been on his shift.〔
Petrov underwent intense questioning by his superiors about his judgment. Initially, he was praised for his decision.〔 General Yury Votintsev, then commander of the Soviet Air Defense's Missile Defense Units, who was the first to hear Petrov's report of the incident (and the first to reveal it to the public in the 1990s), states that Petrov's "correct actions" were "duly noted."〔 Petrov himself states he was initially praised by Votintsev and promised a reward,〔〔(Тот, который не нажал ). ''Moskovskiye Novosti'' (in Russian)〕 but recalls that he was also reprimanded for improper filing of paperwork under the pretext that he had not described the incident in the war diary.〔〔
He received no reward. According to Petrov, this was because the incident and other bugs found in the missile detection system embarrassed his superiors and the influential scientists who were responsible for it, so that if he had been officially rewarded, they would have had to be punished.〔〔〔〔BBC TV Interview, BBC Moscow correspondent Allan Little, October 1998〕 He was reassigned to a less sensitive post,〔 took early retirement (although he emphasizes that he was not "forced out" of the army, as it is sometimes claimed by Western sources),〔 and suffered a nervous breakdown.〔
In a later interview, Petrov stated that the famous red button has never worked, as military psychologists did not want to put the decision about a war into the hands of one single person.〔(【引用サイトリンク】title=Der rote Knopf hat nie funktioniert )
The incident became known publicly in the 1990s upon the publication of Votintsev's memoirs. Widespread media reports since then have increased public awareness of Petrov's actions.
There is some confusion as to precisely what Petrov's military role was in this incident. Petrov, as an individual, was not in a position where he could single-handedly have launched any of the Soviet missile arsenal. His sole duty was to monitor satellite surveillance equipment and report missile attack warnings up the chain of command; top Soviet leadership would have decided whether to launch a retaliatory attack against the West. But Petrov's role was crucial in providing information to make that decision.〔 According to Bruce Blair, a Cold War nuclear strategies expert and nuclear disarmament advocate, formerly with the Center for Defense Information, "The top leadership, given only a couple of minutes to decide, told that an attack had been launched, would make a decision to retaliate."
Petrov later said "I had obviously never imagined that I would ever face that situation. It was the first and, as far as I know, also the last time that such a thing had happened, except for simulated practice scenarios."〔

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